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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970656-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
JAMES PATRICK IVIE, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1993). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court properly admit the arresting officer's DUI report to 
rehabilitate the officer's impeached testimony? If error, was admission of the report 
harmless where the jury had already heard the substance of the report through the 
officer's testimony? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is 
1 
generally afforded broad discretion. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Salt 
Lake City v. Garcia. 912 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied. 919 P.2d 1208 
(Utah 1996); Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994). 
More specifically, the decision to admit a prior consistent statement for the purpose of 
rehabilitating a witness is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See generally. 
Pena. 869 P.2d at 935-39; see also Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp.. 21 F.3d 721, 
730 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pena. 949 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Pierre. 781 F.2d 329, 330 (2nd Cir. 1986); United States v. Juarez. 549 F.2d 
1113, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977); State v. Bracero. 434 A.2d 286, 291 (R.I. 1981). However, a 
trial court's selection, interpretation, or application of a particular rule of evidence is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Utah Dep't of Transportation v. 6200 
South Associates. 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following controlling statutes and rules are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (1998); 
Utah R.Evid. 803(5) (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant James Patrick Ivie was charged in a May 17, 1996 information with 
driving under the influence ("DUI"), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
2 
Ann. § 41-6-44 (1993), and with having an open container of alcohol in his vehicle, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1993) (R. 13-12).1 
The State moved to dismiss the open container charge and a jury convicted defendant of 
the DUI charge (R. 63, 143). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to zero-to-five years in prison, but suspended 
that sentence and placed defendant on supervised probation for three years on the 
condition that defendant serve one year in jail, pay a $2,000.00 fine, successfully 
complete a residential alcohol treatment program, and not consume or possess alcohol (R. 
161-60). 
Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the trial court erroneously 
admitted a DUI report form prepared by the arresting officer (R. 177-76). The trial court 
denied the motion in an unsigned minute entry (R. 253). Defendant appealed and the trial 
court issued a certificate of probable cause (R. 223, 241). This Court dismissed 
defendant's appeal because there was no final appealable order (R. 272-70). 
Subsequently, the trial court signed an order denying the motion for new trial and 
defendant timely appealed (R. 282, 293). 
!The pages in the record and the transcript are numbered backwards, with the last 
page of each volume beginning with the lowest number and the first page ending with the 
highest number. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, whose blood alcohol level was at .09, was arrested after he attempted 
to drive his car out of a parking lot. This is defendant's fourth DUI conviction since 
February 1991 (R. 13). The following details are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
The arrest 
Around midnight on March 23, 1996, Trooper Troy Marx of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, his ride-along Ken Purdy,2 and Roosevelt City Police Officer Isaccson were 
having a soda break at the local Circle K (R. 436-35, 704, 690). While inside the store, 
Trooper Marx noticed a jeep parked at the gas pumps (R. 435). By the time the officers 
left the store, the jeep had pulled up from the gas pumps and had parked in the entrance of 
an alleyway near the front of the store, and next to the patrol cars (R. 435-34, 407, 703, 
652,621,577). 
As Trooper Marx backed up his cruiser and started to pull forward, he noticed that 
the jeep's license plate was folded in half, making it impossible to read the numbers or 
tell whether the registration was current (R. 434, 406, 703, 686, 653-52). Just as Marx 
determined to talk to the owner of the jeep about the bent plate, Kristin Rogers3 came out 
2At the time, Ken Purdy was in training to be a police officer (R. 654). By trial, 
Purdy was a Utah Highway Patrol trooper (R. 655). 
3By the time of trial, Rogers and defendant had married (R. 627). 
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of the Circle K and got into the front passenger seat of the jeep (R. 434, 410-08, 688). 
The jeep's taillights then came on and the jeep pulled forward two to three feet (R. 433, 
431, 406, 702, 674, 652, 635, 633). Because it was a cold night, Marx and Purdy could 
see exhaust coming from the jeep (R. 406-05, 652, 635, 634). Marx could also hear the 
engine running (R. 433). Marx briefly activated his overhead lights until the jeep stopped 
(R. 406, 702). 
Trooper Marx approached the driver's side of the jeep, while Officer Isaccson 
went to the passenger side (R. 433, 431, 405, 702). Marx recognized the driver as the 
defendant, someone with whom he had gone to junior and senior high school (R. 431, 
397, 582). Defendant acknowledged to Marx that his registration had expired (R. 430). 
The trooper smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and asked how much defendant had 
had to drink (R. 430). Defendant replied that he had had "a couple of beers," but that he 
was only going a couple of blocks to Ms. Rogers' house (R. 430, 423). 
At the trooper's request, defendant performed several field sobriety tests (R. 430-
24). Marx, Isaccson, and Purdy all noted that defendant's balance was off during the tests 
(R. 426, 425, 423, 700, 651). Defendant did not pass the Horizontal Gaze and Eye 
Stagmus test4 (R. 429). A portable breathalyser indicated that defendant's alcohol level 
4The test involves observing the subject's eye movement as it follows a moving 
object, such as a pen (R. 429). An eye's smooth pursuit of the pen indicates a lack of 
alcohol (R. 429). Eyes that bounce as they follow the pen indicate that the person is 
under the influence of alcohol (R. 429-28). Marx testified that defendant had a very 
obvious eye stagmus or lack of a smooth pursuit (R. 429-28). See (Cite - accepting 
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exceeded the legal limit of .08 (R. 424, 574). 
Throughout the sobriety tests, defendant pleaded with Marx to give him a break 
because if he was arrested he would go to prison (R. 430, 422, 699, 697, 651). Ms. 
Rogers commented several times during the stop that this was all her fault because she 
had convinced defendant to take her to the store (R. 401, 651, 650, 637). 
Although reluctant to do so because of their acquaintanceship, Marx arrested 
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol (R. 423, 396, 697-96, 678, 659, 651). 
A subsequent inventory search of the jeep revealed an open can containing a consumable 
amount of beer sitting between the two seats with a blanket or some type of clothing 
placed over it (R. 698). 
Marx transported defendant to the Roosevelt City Police Department where he 
administered a breathalyser test (R. 422-20). After verifying that defendant had blown a 
.09, Marx read defendant his Miranda rights from a pre-printed DUI Report Form (State's 
Exhibit 9, see Addendum B; R. 416-15, 388, 313). Still reading from the pre-printed 
form, the trooper asked defendant if he understood his rights and if he was willing to 
waive them (R. 416-15). Marx wrote down defendant's affirmative responses on the 
form (R. 416-15, 528-27). 
Marx then asked defendant a series of questions which he read from the pre-
validity of test). 
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printed report form (R. 416-12, 527-26, 525-24). Marx wrote down on the form 
defendant's responses to the questions, word for word, as defendant uttered them (R. 527-
24). Some of defendant's responses were incriminating and indicated that defendant had 
driven the jeep from Ms. Roger's house to the Circle K and from the gas pumps to the 
front of the store, and that defendant had intended to drive the jeep back to Ms. Roger's 
home (Addendum B). On the back of the report form, the trooper wrote a short summary 
of his observations and the arrest (Addendum B; R. 528-27, 513). 
Five months after the arrest, Ms. Rogers told Marx and the prosecutor that she, not 
defendant, had driven the jeep to the Circle K that night and that she was the one who had 
pulled the jeep from the gas pumps to the alleyway (R. 388, 383, 551). She then claimed 
that she had had sole possession of the keys that night and that although defendant had 
been sitting in the driver's seat when the officer approached the jeep, the car could not 
have been running because she had the only set of keys to the car (R. 388, 383, 620, 617-
16, 612). Ms. Rogers testified that she told the officers this at the arrest scene and at the 
police station that night (R. 609, 603-02, 599, 596-95). However, Marx, Isaccson, and 
Purdy, all testified that Ms. Rogers had not mentioned that she had been driving that night 
or that she had the keys (R. 404, 402-01, 388-87, 701, 697, 614-12, 676, 634). Marx 
maintained that Ms. Rogers first made this claim to him five months after the arrest (R. 
388,383,551). 
7 
Admission of the DUI Report Form 
Trooper Marx testified during the State's case-in-chief regarding the arrest, the 
breathalyzer tests, and statements made by defendant (R. 436-365). On direct 
examination, the prosecutor asked Marx to read from the DUI report form the questions 
asked of defendant and defendant's responses (R. 415-12). Defendant did not object, and 
the following exchange took place: 
Q (by prosecuting attorney): Would you tell us whether or not he [defendant] 
indicated he understood his rights? 
A (Marx): Yes. I asked him, after reading him his Miranda rights I asked, "Do you 
understand each of these rights I explained to you?" His response was, "Yep." 
Q: Did you ask him another question? 
A: I asked him, "Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to me now?" 
His response was, "Go ahead." 
Q: And what questions did you ask the defendant? You may want to refer to your 
report to get this exact. And what were his responses to you? 
A: The DUI report form has specific questions for us to ask. I usually just go 
follow it word for word. On the first question I asked was, "Where you operating 
a vehicle?" 
Q: And what was his response word for word? 
A: He said, "Pulled from the gas pumps up to Circle K." 
Q: And then what did you ask him? 
A: I asked him, "Where were you going?" 
Q: What was his response? 
A: His response was, "Back to Christine's house." 
Q: And then what did you ask him? 
A: I asked him, "Where did you start from?" 
Q: And what did he respond? 
A: He responded, "From her house." 
Q: Then tell us what was asked and what was responded after that. 
A: Okay. I asked him when he left. He said, "Just before you pulled us over." 
Um, I then asked him what time it was. He said, "12:30, probably." I asked him 
what the date was. He said, "March 22nd." I asked him what day of week it was. 
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He said, "Friday." 
Q: Now the actual time is about what, 20 minutes off? 
A: Yes. It was at that time I made note the time was 0050. 
Q: All right. 
A: Ten minutes to one. The date was the 23rd, just the, you know, the next 
morning. It was Saturday. I asked him, "What city or county are you in now? He 
said, "Roosevelt. Duchesne County. Roosevelt Police Department." I asked him, 
"What were you doing during the last three hours?" He said, "Riding back from 
Park City." I then asked him, "Have you been drinking?" He said, "When I got 
back." I then asked, "What did you drink?" He said, "Beer." I asked him, "How 
much beer did you have to drink?" He said, "A couple of beers." I asked him, 
"Where did you drink these?" He stated, "At Christine's house." I asked him 
when he had his first drink. And he said it was about 10 o'clock that night. Then I 
asked him when he had his last drink. He stated to me that it was 30 minutes 
before I pulled him over. 
Q: What did you ask then? 
A: I asked him the question, "Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage 
now?" And he stated to me, "No, I don't think so." 
Q: What did you ask then? 
A: I asked him if he was taking any tranquilizer pills or medicine or pills or drugs 
of any kind. He stated, "No." I asked him if he was sick or ill. And he said, No, 
he wasn't. That's all the questions I asked him. 
(R. 415-12; Addendum C). 
When defendant testified on direct, he denied telling Marx that he had driven the 
vehicle at all that evening or that he had driven the jeep from the gas pumps to the curb 
(R. 568, 566). In fact, defendant testified that he had made it "perfectly clear" that he had 
not driven the jeep that night (R. 567, 566; see Addendum D). Defendant also testified 
that he did not have the keys to the car at the time of the stop, that the engine was not 
running, and that the jeep definitely did not move (R. 567). Defendant believed that Marx 
held a grudge against him because of a fist fight between the two in junior high, in which 
9 
defendant had "beat Marx up pretty good," and for which both had been suspended from 
school (R. 583-81, 560).5 
On cross-examination, defendant continued to deny that he had ever told the 
trooper that he had driven the jeep that night (R. 566, 563). The prosecutor showed 
defendant the written DUI report form, marked as State's Exhibit 9, and asked if he 
recalled being read his Miranda rights as reflected on the form (R. 565). Defendant 
replied that he recalled being read his rights, but was not sure that he responded to the 
question of whether he understood his rights and did not believe that he said, "Go ahead," 
when asked if he was willing to talk to police (R. 564). Defendant conceded that he 
answered some questions while he was at the police station, but insisted that when Marx 
asked him if he had been operating a vehicle, defendant had said, "No" (R. 563). 
The State re-called Marx on rebuttal (R. 552, see Addendum E). Marx identified 
State's Exhibit 9 as the DUI report form that he had filled out while interviewing 
defendant at the police station (R. 529). Marx testified that he began by reading 
defendant his Miranda rights as printed at the top of the form word for word and that he 
checked off each right as he read it (R. 527). He then explained that he read defendant 
each of the relevant questions on the form and that he wrote down exactly what defendant 
5Although Marx testified that he had been in fights in junior high, he did not 
specifically recall fighting with defendant (R. 397-96). Marx denied holding a grudge 
against defendant (R. 396). Significantly, Ms. Rogers testified that Marx and defendant 
appeared to be friends during the initial stop (R. 613), and both Purdy and Isaccson 
testified that Marx had expressed a reluctance to arrest defendant (R. 697-96, 678, 651). 
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said in response (R. 527-26, 524). Marx testified that in writing down defendant's 
responses, he did not change anything, add any dramatics, or change incomplete 
sentences to complete sentences; rather, he wrote down defendant's responses verbatim 
(R. 527, 524). At the prosecutor's request, Marx again read the questions he asked 
defendant and defendant's responses6 (R. 526-24). 
Over defendant's objection, the trial court admitted a redacted version of the DUI 
report form on the ground that it was a prior consistent statement of Marx admissible 
under rule 801(d)(1)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 544-531, see Addendum F). The 
redacted version included the questions asked by defendant with his responses 
(Addendum B). On the back of the exhibit was a handwritten statement by Marx: 
"Subject's vehicle was running and began to move when I noticed that the vehicle's rear 
license plate was folded over" (Addendum B). The rest of Marx's summary was deleted 
from the exhibit (R. 538-35, 533; Addendum B). The trial court explained that it was 
admitting the exhibit because defendant had vigorously questioned whether Marx had 
been truthful and had implied that Marx had an improper motive for fabricating his 
testimony (R. 534). The trial court concluded that the State was therefore entitled to 
introduce the report to dispel any implication that Marx had recently fabricated his 
testimony (R. 534). 
6Defendant did not object to this second reading of the interview portion of the 
report (R. 527-24). 
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Additional relevant facts may be found in the argument section. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the written DUI report was improperly admitted as a prior 
consistent statement under rule 801(d)(1)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence, because it was not 
prepared before the motive for the officer to fabricate arose. Defendant waived this 
argument because he did not make it below. Defendant objected to the admission of the 
report only on the ground that it was a recorded recollection that was inadmissible under 
rules 803(5) and 803(8)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence. Because defendant did not make a 
rule 801 argument below, this Court should decline to address that argument now. 
In the event the Court reaches the merits of defendant's claim, the interview 
portion of the report was properly admitted. Although the State agrees with defendant 
that the summary portion report did not meet the criteria for admission under the rules of 
evidence, the interview portion of the report was admissible as a prior consistent 
statement for the purpose of rehabilitating Marx's testimony. 
In any event, any error in admitting the report was harmless because the jury had 
already heard as substantive evidence the contents of the interview portion of the report 
through Marx's testimony. Moreover, the short handwritten statement on the back of the 
report stated only what the jury had already heard several times through the testimony of 
the three police officers. Defendant has not challenged the admissibility or propriety of 
any of that testimony. 
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Defendant nevertheless argues that the report should have been excluded under 
rule 803(5) as a recorded recollection. Whether or not the report was admissible under 
rule 803(5) is beside the point because it was admissible as a prior consistent statement to 
rehabilitate Marx's testimony. The fact that evidence may be inadmissible for one 
purpose does not bar its admission under a different rule and for a different purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INTERVIEW PORTION OF THE DUI REPORT FORM 
WAS ADMISSIBLE TO REHABILITATE THE OFFICER'S 
TESTIMONY; ALTHOUGH ADMISSION OF THE BACK 
SUMMARY PORTION OF THE REPORT WAS ERROR, IT 
WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE ITS CONTENTS WERE 
ALREADY BEFORE THE JURY THROUGH THE 
OFFICERS' TESTIMONY. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the DUI report form under 
rule 801(d)(1)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence, because the report did not meet the criteria for 
admissibility under that rule. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br. App."] at 14-17. 
Defendant also argues that the report was nothing more than a recorded recollection used 
to refresh the trooper's memory and that, as such, should have been excluded under Rule 
803(5), Utah Rules of Evidence. Br. App. 18-20. Defendant asserts that admitting the 
report was prejudicial. Br. App. 24. 
Defendant waived his argument that the report did not meet the criteria of rule 
801(d)(1)(B) because he did not specifically raise that argument below. If the Court 
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nevertheless reaches the merits of this issue, the State agrees that the summary contained 
on the back of the report did not satisfy the criteria for admission under the rules of 
evidence. However, the majority of the report containing the interview portion was 
admissible as a prior consistent statement for the limited purpose of rehabilitating Marx's 
testimony regarding the veracity and accuracy of the report itself. Even if it was error to 
admit any part of the report, it was harmless because the contents of both the interview 
and summary portions of the report had already been properly admitted as substantive 
evidence through the testimony of Marx and the other two officers. Moreover, rule 
803(5) does not require exclusion of the report, because the report was offered to 
rehabilitate the trooper's testimony, and not as a recorded recollection. 
A. Defendant waived his argument that the report did not meet the criteria 
for admission as substantive evidence under rule 801(d)(1)(B). 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that an out-of-court 
statement is not hearsay, and is therefore admissible as substantive evidence, if "[t]he 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant's testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive." Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (1998). 
Defendant argues that it was wrong to admit the DUI report under rule 
801(d)(1)(B) because that rule allows the admission of prior consistent statements only 
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when they were made before the alleged fabrication, motive, or improper Influence to 
fabricate arose. Br. App. 14-15. Defendant asserts that the report did not meet this 
temporal "pre-motive" requirement because the alleged fabrication occurred in the DUI 
report itself, and because the report was prepared while Marx was under the alleged 
motive to fabricate, that is, the "grudge" held over from a junior high fight. Br. App. 16-
17. 
Defendant did not preserve this argument for appeal because he did not raise it 
below. When the trial court ruled that the DUI report was admissible under rule 
801(d)(1)(B), defendant objected only on the grounds that 1) the DUI report was an 
unsigned statement of defendant and not a statement of Marx, and 2) the document was 
no more than a recorded recollection that was inadmissible under rule 803(5), Utah Rules 
of Evidence (R. 544-31). Defendant never suggested to the trial court that the report 
should not come in because it had not met the criteria under rule 801(d)(1)(B). After the 
verdict, defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the DUI report was 
improperly admitted (R. 178). Again, defendant failed to even mention that the report 
failed to meet the requirements of rule 801(d)(1)(B), but instead argued that the DUI 
report was in effect a police report that was inadmissible under rule 803(8)(B), the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule (R. 177-76). 
This Court has consistently held that a claim of error is not preserved on appeal 
unless the appellant raised a timely and specific objection before the trial court. State v. 
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Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Pugmire. 898 P.2d 271, 272-73 n.4 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993). The 
purpose of requiring a specific and timely objection is to "'put[] the judge on notice of the 
asserted error and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding.'" kL at 359 (quoting Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989)) 
(brackets in original); see also Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 
(Utah App. 1996). 
Although defendant's objection to the admission of the report was timely, it was 
not specific enough to put the trial court on notice that the report might not be admissible 
under rule 801(d)(1)(B) because the report had not met the rule's "pre-motive" 
requirement. Significantly, even after defendant had time to reflect, he still failed to bring 
that argument to the trial court's attention in his motion for a new trial. This Court should 
therefore decline to address defendant's argument on this point.7 See Beltran-Felix, 922 
P.2d at 33 (declining to review arguments not presented to trial court). 
B. The report was admissible as a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate 
the trooper's testimony regarding the report's veracity and accuracy. 
Even if the Court reaches the merits of defendant's argument, as explained below, 
7An appellate court will review an issue not raised below if the appellant 
demonstrates plain error. Pugmire, 898 P.2d at 272. In this case, defendant has not 
argued, let alone demonstrated, plain error. See id. 
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the interview section of the DUI report was properly admitted to rehabilitate Marx's 
testimony. 
At the outset, it is important to note that defendant does not challenge the 
admission of the substance of the interview portion of the report as read by Marx.8 
Rather, defendant only challenges the admissibility of the physical document. Br. App. 
13-17. Thus, the only issue here is whether it was reversible error for the trial court to 
admit the report as an exhibit. 
As stated, defendant challenges the admissibility of the entire DUI report on the 
ground that it did not meet the criteria for admission under rule 801(d)(1)(B). Relying on 
federal authority, defendant asserts that rule 801(d)(1)(B) has a temporal pre-motive 
requirement that bars admission of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence 
unless the statement was made before the declarant had a motive to fabricate. Br. App. 
14-17. Defendant correctly points out that the entire DUI report in this case was prepared 
while Marx was under the alleged motive to fabricate. Thus, if rule 801(d)(1)(B) does 
have a temporal requirement, the DUI report would not be admissible under that rule. 
Prior to 1995, the federal Courts of Appeals were divided on the issue of whether 
out-of-court consistent statements were admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B), Federal Rules 
8Indeed, Marx's testimony regarding defendant's statements during the interview 
was clearly admissible as an admission by a party-opponent under rule 801(d)(2)(A). That 
rule provides that a statement is not hearsay and therefore admissible as substantive 
evidence if "[t]he statement is offered against a party and is the party's own statement." 
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of Evidence, if they were made after the alleged fabrication or alleged improper influence 
or motive arose. See, e.g.. United States v. Vest. 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir.), cert, denied. 
488 U.S. 965 (1988) (statement must antedate motive to fabricate to be admissible under 
rule 801(d)(1)(B)); United States v. Pierre. 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); 
United States v. Casoni. 950 F.2d 893, 904-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. 
Henderson. 717 F.2d 135, 138-39 (4th Cir.1983) (same), cert, denied. 465 U.S. 1009 
(1984); United States v. Patterson. 23 F.3d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir.1994) (same), cert-
denied. 513 U.S. 1007 (1994): United States v. White. 11 F.3d 1446, 1450 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(same); cf, United States v. Parrv. 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing 
statements made after motive to fabricate under rule 801(d)(1)(B)); United States v. 
Lawson. 872 F.2d 179, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1989) (same), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 834 (1989); 
United States v. Miller. 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.1989) (same); United States v. Tome. 3 
F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993) (same), rev'd. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995); United States v. 
Pendas-Martinez. 845 F.2d 938 n.6 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Montague. 
958 F.2d 1094, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same). 
In 1995, the United States Supreme court resolved the conflict for the federal 
courts by holding that an out-of-court consistent statement could be admitted under the 
federal rule 801(d)(1)(B) only if the statement had been made before the alleged 
fabrication or improper influence or motive arose. Tome v. United States. 115 S.Ct. 696, 
701-02 (1995). 
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No Utah court has directly addressed whether the Utah rule, which is identical to 
the federal rule, imposes the same requirement. Although federal authority interpreting 
an identically-worded rule may be helpful, and even persuasive, it is not controlling. 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors. Inc.. 335 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 9 n.5 (Utah 1998); Dikeou v. 
Osborn. 881 P.2d 943, 946 n.5 (Utah App. 1994). This Court need not decide whether 
Utah's rule 801(d)(1)(B) imposes a pre-motive requirement, however, because even if the 
report did not meet the criteria of rule 801(d)(1)(B), at least the interview portion of the 
report was otherwise admissible for the purpose of rehabilitating Marx's testimony.9 
Admission of the summary on the back of the report was harmless. 
Several courts, both before and after Tome, have held that prior consistent 
statements that do not technically meet the criteria of rule 801(d)(1)(B) may still be 
admissible if they are offered, not for their truth, but for the limited purpose of 
rehabilitating an impeached witness. United States v. Ellis. 121 F.3d 908, 919 (4th Cir. 
1997). cert, denied. 118 S.Ct. 738 (1998): Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp.. 21 
F.3d 721, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pierre. 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2nd Cir. 
1986); United States v. Harris. 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Obavagbona. 627 F. Supp. 329, 335-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); People v. Segura. 923 P.2d 266, 
9An appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper ground, even 
though the trial court relied on a different ground. DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995); State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985); State v. Beleard. 811 P.2d 
211,213 (Utah 1991). 
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269 (Colo. App. 1995); Holmes v. State. 1998 WL 351207 (Md. July 2, 1998) (not yet 
released for publication). These cases recognize that the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
"did not replace the admissibility of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness, 
but merely allowed a certain subset of these statements to be used as substantive evidence 
of the truth of the matter asserted." Ellis. 121 F.3d at 919. Thus, where prior consistent 
statements are offered not for their truth, but for the limited purpose of rehabilitation, rule 
801(d)(1)(B) and its restrictions do not apply. Id.; Engebretsen, 21 F.3d at 729-30; Pierre, 
781 F.2d at 333; Harris. 761F.2d at 400; Holmes, 1998 WL 351207 at 2. 
Before the adoption of Utah's rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized the validity of that general principle: "where there has been an attempt to 
impeach or discredit a witness, prior statements consistent with his present testimony may 
be offered to offset the impeachment." State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1957) 
(pre-Utah Rules of Evidence): see State v. Asav, 631 P.2d 861, 863-64 (Utah 1981) 
(under former rules of evidence, police report was admissible as prior consistent 
statement to rehabilitate impeached officer's testimony). 
The standard for determining whether a prior consistent statement is admissible 
under this exception is "'whether the particular consistent statement sought to be used has 
some rebutting force beyond the mere fact that the witness has repeated on a prior 
occasion a statement consistent with his trial testimony.'" Ellis, 121 F.3d at 920 (quoting 
United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1994)). In other words, to be 
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admissible, a prior consistent statement must be relevant to rehabilitate the impeached 
witness's credibility. See Harris, 761 F.2d at 399; Juarez, 549 F.2d at 1114. For that 
reason, the proposed prior consistent statements must be directed only at the specific 
impeachment made and must include a statement that will support the particular 
testimony that has been impeached. Musgrove v. United States, 441 A.2d 980, 985 (D.C. 
1982); see also Sibert, 310 P.2d at 392 (error to admit prior consistent statements that did 
not go to impeached testimony); State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Utah 1989) 
(same). 
Prior consistent statements in the form of written reports are also admissible for 
rehabilitative purposes so long as they are relevant to rebut the specific impeachment that 
occurred. For example, in Juarez, two drug enforcement officers testified about their 
transactions with the defendants. Juarez. 549 F.2d at 1114. On cross-examination, the 
defendant questioned the accuracy of written reports prepared by the officers and 
suggested that important details testified to had been omitted from the reports. Id. On re-
direct examination, the Government offered the reports to rehabilitate the two officers. 
Id. Recognizing that rule 801(d)(1)(B) did not apply to this situation, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the reports were relevant to rebut the impeachment of the 
officers and were therefore admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the 
officers' credibility. IcL The court reasoned that the officers' answers concerning the 
reports were necessarily fragmentary and that the jury might have been misled as to the 
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officers' credibility in the absence of an opportunity to see the reports themselves: 
Whether [the officer's] testimony that the reports were generalized 
summaries and therefore could not be expected to contain all the details was 
credible, and whether the reports despite their omissions, constituted 
reasonably accurate summaries of the events described by the witnesses on 
the stand, could best be determined by a reading of the reports themselves. 
Id. at 1114. See also Ellis. 121 F.3dat 919-21 (impeached witness's prior written 
statement to law enforcement admissible for rehabilitation where defendant challenged 
witness with prior inconsistent statement); Engebretsen. 21 F.3d at 729-30 (expert 
witness's written report admissible to rebut plaintiffs charge of bias and prior 
inconsistent statements); Harris. 761 F.2d at 398-400 (witness's prior consistent statement 
admissible to rebut charge that witness had made prior inconsistent statement); 
Obayagbona. 627 F. Supp. at 336 (taped prior consistent statement of officer admissible 
to rehabilitate officer's testimony); Pierre. 781 F.2d at 333-34 (DEA agent's formal police 
report admissible to rebut claim that important detail had been omitted from original 
handwritten notes); Holmes v. State. 1998 WL 351207 (Md. July 2, 1998) (prior 
consistent statement admissible to rebut prior inconsistent statement); State v. Jordan. 646 
S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1983) (same); State v. Bracero. 434 A.2d 286, 290 (R.I. 1981) (police 
report admissible as prior consistent statement to rehabilitate officer's testimony where 
officer charged with prior inconsistent statement). 
Although the trial court in this case gave rule 801 as the basis for its ruling, it is 
clear from the record that the trial court's primary concern in admitting the report was to 
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allow the State to rehabilitate Marx's testimony (Addendum F). Defendant impeached 
Marx first by denying that he made some of the responses that Marx said he did, and, 
second by suggesting that some of his responses to questions were not accurately 
recorded by Marx (R. 568-57, 566-63). Defendant's testimony, therefore, opened the 
door for Marx to explain in detail his custom of reading the questions from the DUI report 
form word for word and writing down the suspect's responses verbatim. In that context, 
the interview portion of the written report itself became directly relevant to Marx's 
credibility and to the accuracy of the report. The language used and the incomplete 
sentences that Marx wrote down as defendant's responses support Marx's testimony that 
he wrote down the answers verbatim. For example, after the question, "Do you 
understand each of these rights I have explained to. you," Marx wrote down, "Yep." Also, 
after the question, "Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now," Marx 
wrote, "Go ahead." (Addendum B). Further down, the written responses are written in 
incomplete sentences, such as "pulled from the gas pumps up to Circle K," "From her 
house," "12:30 probably" (Addendum B). Some of the answers are written in the first 
person: "When I got back," "30 min. before you pulled us over," and "No, I don't think 
so." (Addendum B). The jury could reasonably infer from these written responses that 
Marx was telling the truth when he said that he assiduously wrote defendant's answers 
word for word as defendant uttered them. The jury could have also concluded from the 
written responses that if Marx had been inclined to fabricate the answers as suggested by 
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defendant, Marx might have used more conventional language, complete sentences, or 
simply paraphrased the responses so that he could not be second guessed. 
While it is true that Marx had already read defendant's responses to the jury, 
hearing the responses did not, and could not, provide the same sense that Marx had made 
verbatim notations on the report, as seeing the report could. In listening to the responses, 
it is easy to pay more attention to the substance and meaning of the statements than to the 
unique language and usage that supports Marx's testimony of a faithful recording. Thus, 
viewing the written report itself was the best way for the jury to determining whether 
Marx had made up the responses or inaccurately written them down. See Juarez, 549 
F.2d at 1114 (under facts of that case, important for jury to actually see written police 
reports so as to determine whether despite alleged omissions reports were reasonably 
accurate summaries of events). 
In sum, the interview portion of the report was admissible, not to prove the truth of 
the statements themselves, but for the purpose of allowing the jury to judge whether Marx 
had indeed written defendant's responses word for word. The interview portion, 
therefore, did not have to meet the criteria of rule 801(d)(1)(B) for admission as 
substantive evidence.10 
10Ordinarily, when prior consistent statements are admitted solely to rehabilitate a 
witness, a trial court should instruct the jury that those statements may not be considered 
substantively or for their truth. See, e.g., Ellis, 121 F.3d at 920; Juarez, 549 F.2d at 1114. 
The fact that no limiting instruction was given in this case, however, does not matter. As 
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Marx's handwritten statement on the back of the report, however, was not 
admissible for purposes of rehabilitation. That short sentence stated that Marx saw that 
defendant's vehicle was running and began to move. Marx's testimony was not 
impeached on that point and was therefore inadmissible for rehabilitation purposes. See 
Sibert, 310 P.2d at 392; Thomas. 777 P12d at 449-50; Musgrove. 441 A.2d at 985. 
Nevertheless, as explained below, that error was harmless. 
C. Any error in admitting any part of the report was harmless because the 
contents of the report had already been properly admitted as substantive 
evidence through the trooper and the other officers. 
Even if it were error to admit both the interview and summary portions of the 
report, that error was harmless. Defendant argues that any error was prejudicial because 
it was unnecessarily cumulative and in effect resulted in undue emphasis being given to 
the report. Br. App. 24. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, the Utah Supreme Court and other courts have 
consistently recognized that exhibits or other evidence erroneously admitted are harmless 
if they contain only evidence that the jury has already properly heard. See, e.g.. State v. 
Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 643-44 (Utah) (harmless error to admit transcript abstract as exhibit 
stated, the contents of the report had already been properly admitted through Marx's 
testimony as substantive evidence. Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of that 
testimony. Because the substance of the report was already properly admitted as 
substantive evidence, telling the jury that it could only consider the report for 
rehabilitative purposes would make no sense. 
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in part because most of the transcript had already been read to jury), cert, denied, 116 
S.Ct. 163 (1995); Thomas. 777 P.2d at 450 (harmless error to allow police officer to 
testify as to victim's prior consistent statements because it was merely cumulative to 
victim's testimony); Engebretsen. 21 F.3d at 731 (harmless error to admit portion of 
expert witness's report because there was nothing in it that had not already been testified 
to); Juarez. 549 F.2d at 1114 (defendants not prejudiced by admission of police reports 
where substance of reports had already been testified to). 
In this case, as defendant concedes, the jury had already heard the verbatim 
contents of the interview portion of the report at least twice through Marx's testimony (R. 
415-12). The jury also heard much of the substance of the interview while the prosecutor 
attempted to impeach defendant on cross-examination (R. 566-63). Moreover, the 
handwritten statement on the back stated only what the jury had already heard at least 
three times through the testimony of Marx, Purdy, and Isaccson (R. 433, 431, 406-05, 
702, 674, 652, 635, 634, 633)). 
Given that the jury had already heard everything contained in the DUI report form 
more than once, it cannot be said that the report's admission made any difference on the 
outcome of this trial. 
D. Rule 803(5) does not require exclusion of the report because the report 
was not offered as a recorded recollection. 
Defendant renews his argument made below that the DUI report was used as a 
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recorded recollection to refresh Marx's initial testimony and was therefore inadmissible 
under rule 803(5). Br. App. 18-20. That rule provides that the hearsay rule does not 
exclude 
[a] memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had 
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify 
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the 
matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. 
Utah R. Evid. 803(5) (1998). That rule further provides that if admitted, "the 
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an 
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party." Id 
First, it is not at all clear that the DUI report was ever used as a recorded 
recollection to refresh Marx's testimony. While it is true that Marx read from the report 
at the prosecutor's invitation, defendant did not object to this procedure and it was never 
established that Marx read from the report because he had insufficient recollection to 
enable him to testify fully and accurately regarding the interview with defendant (R. 415-
12). 
Second, the fact that the report might not have been admissible under rule 803(5) 
does not bar its proper admission under another rule, such as to rehabilitate Marx's 
testimony. As Professor Wigmore explained 
when an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and becomes admissible by 
satisfying all the rules applicable to it in that capacity\ it is not inadmissible 
because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity and 
because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity. This doctrine, 
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through involving certain risks, is indispensable as a practical rule. 
1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 13, pp. 300 (1940) (emphasis in original). This doctrine has 
been expressly recognized and adopted in this jurisdiction. See, e.g.. Hill v. Hartog. 658 
P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983) (evidence incompetent as to one party or purpose cannot be 
excluded if admissible as to another party or for another purpose); State v. Neal, 254 
P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1953) (evidence admissible when offered for proper purpose even 
though it would be inadmissible if offered for some other purpose), cert, denied, 347 U.S. 
963 (1954); State v. Green. 89 Utah 437, 452, 57 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah 1936) (when two 
different bases for admission exists, evidence should not be excluded if admissible for 
either purpose); State v. Cooper. 201 P.2d 764, 768 (Utah 1949) (evidence cannot be 
excluded merely because it is incompetent for some purposes); see State v. Bowman. 945 
P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (no limiting instruction required for defendant's 
statements admitted for impeachment purposes because statements had already been 
admitted as substantive evidence). 
As explained above, the report was properly admissible as a prior consistent 
statement to rehabilitate Marx's testimony. Therefore, the fact that the report itself could 
not have been admitted under rule 803(5) is irrelevant and does not bar its admission. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction.. 
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Utah R. Evid. 801 and 803(5) 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
oonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter 
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum 
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
ADDENDUM B 
DUI REPORT 
(State's Exhibit #9) 
xi. irtrERviBW 
Was subjec^ advised of the following rights? tfPt Whpn? £6/4 r was subject^ .aoyisea or the follo ing nghts? V(*M hpn? GO' 
By//horn L & V — K W Whe r e ? I£E 
You have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being 
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering 
questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
—u- 1. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? 
Response iff j>- . 
j. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now? 
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Were you operating vehicle? b,\\pA ^ ^ W — g ^ ftw^t «J> 4r ft*U \< 
Where
 were you going? | W V \n C W ^ W ^ f I^ISP ' 
What street or highway were you on? 
Direction
 0f travel? 
Where did you start from? Ktr^ U - VU>^^? 
When?ytV W W IUU What time is it nnw7 i r i n fr^W^u 
What b i f e y ^ U ^ - M„„A_ ^cA r L ^ ^ _ ^ ; Acsv/ (Actual t ime_*L^ ; P a t e - i ^ * £
 D a y of Week? £ ^ / H r , v ) 
What s$ty
 p/ cov/>}y a/a you )/> nnw*) x*c&fiof)L JVrVvcjM^ £>. ^ 4 
What vvere you doing during the last three hours? ^ jw^g , Ovu-V <{k>^ w^rV Cl4y . 
Have V o u f o e P drinking? ( . ^ y ^ J* CTfL W f r 
What?, Raic How much? <A TOUAU WLE>TS 
Where> C(n*:*\w* f-Ui*^ ' 
When yid
 y o u have your first drink? tft fofiu 1"—lO'OP Jr/^W( Lasjdrink? ^ ^^ - kjjff ^ ^<M 
Are yog under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) nnw? ^^^^i^^^^^k sa ' v 
Are yog taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? M> 
(Whatl<jnc|? Get sample) , . 
When qjd
 y o u have the last dose?< , _ 
Are yog m__0SL 
(If subject was in'an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were you involved in an accident today?--
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident?. 
If so, what? . ; When? 
How mUch? . 
txhlblt 
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XII. OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: 
n V N A < ( J A 4 U 4 - A W y v p U ^ C ^ x - \{CM%L >^\aW t^&5 -QiJgA fr)PC 
ADDENDUM C 
Partial Transcript of Trooper Marx's Testimony on Direct Examination 
1 MAKE SURE IT IS CLEAN 15 MINUTES BEFORE TEST CAN BE GIVEN. 
2 Q AND DID YOU DO THAT WITH THE DEFENDANT? 
3 A YES, I DID. 
4 Q WAS THERE ANYTHING IN HIS MOUTH? 
5 A NO, THERE WASN'T. 
6 Q AND DID YOU KEEP TRACK CONTINUOUSLY FOR --
7 A FROM THE TIME I CHECKED HIS MOUTH UNTIL THE TEST 
8 WAS GIVEN I WAS WITH HIM IN HIS PRESENCE AND NOTHING WAS PUT 
9 INTO HIS MOUTH THAT I AM AWARE OF. 
10 Q AND DID YOU WATCH -- WAS THAT A PERIOD OF HOW LONG? 
11 A IT WAS IN THE TIME HE WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST UNTIL 
12 I THINK IT WAS ABOUT 20 MINUTES IS ALL. 20. 
13 Q MORE THAN 15 MINUTES? 
14 A YES, MORE THAN 15 MINUTES. 
15 Q SO THEN WHAT DID YOU DO? 
16 A I THEN READ HIM THE ADMONITIONS THAT ARE ON OUR --
17 WE HAVE TO READ, BEFORE HE TAKES A TEST, WE HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO 
18 HIM WHAT WE ARE ASKING HIM TO DO AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES 
19 OF A TEST THAT'S OVER .08 LIMIT. I READ HIM THOSE, ADVISED 
20 HIM THAT HIS WAS. WE HAVE TO READ IT WORD-FOR-WORD SO THEY 
21 KNOW WHAT TIME WE READ IT AND HIS RESPONSE TO IT. AND THAT 
22 WAS READ. 
23 Q OKAY. AND DID HE AGREE TO SUBMIT TO THE TEST? 
24 A YES, HE DID. 
25 Q OKAY. NOW, DO YOU HAVE A CERTAIN ORDER OF THINGS 
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1 THAT THE TEST PROCEEDS IN? 
2 A YES, WE DO. 
3 Q SHOWING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 
4 3, CAN YOU IDENTIFY THAT? 
5 A THIS IS A CHECK LIST THAT WE FOLLOW TO DO AN 
6 INTOXILYZER TEST. AT THE TOP IT ASKS FOR HIS NAME, THE DATE, 
7 SERIAL NUMBER ON THE INSTRUMENT LOCATION, AND THE OPERATOR. 
8 THEN IT HAS A CHECK LIST. AND YOU GO RIGHT DOWN THE CHECK 
9 LIST. NUMBER ONE IS, PUSH THE ON BUTTON. I MEAN, WE START AT 
10 THE VERY BEGINNING. 
11 Q AND WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PUTTING A CHECK? 
12 A THAT'S TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVEN'T GONE OUT OF ORDER, 
13 THAT EVERYTHING IS DONE IN ORDER AND THAT NOTHING IS SKIPPED. 
14 Q OKAY. DID YOU DO EVERYTHING THAT YOU PUT A CHECK 
15 MARK BY? 
16 A YES, I DID. 
17 Q AND WHAT DID YOU DO? WHAT WERE THE STEPS YOU 
18 FOLLOWED? 
19 A WHAT WERE THE STEPS? UM, THE NUMBER ONE IS RED 
20 POWER SWITCH ON. THEN THE INSTRUMENT WILL READ PUSH BUTTON TO 
21 START TEST. NUMBER TWO, PRESS GREEN SET BUTTON. THREE IS 
22 PRINTOUT CARD; FOUR, INSERT STERILE MOUTHPIECE INTO THE BREATH 
23 HOSE. AND THE INSTRUMENT WILL READ PLEASE BLOW INTO 
24 MOUTHPIECE UNTIL TONE STOPS. WHEN IT'S RED, THAT IS WHEN 
25 JIMMY IS ASKED TO BLOW. NUMBER FIVE, IS I'LL OBTAIN A BREATH 
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1 SAMPLE. NUMBER SIX, REMOVE THE MOUTHPIECE, RETURN THE HOSE TO 
2 THE BRACKET. THIS WILL GO THROUGH ALL CHECKS AND PRINT THE 
3 RESULTS ON THE TEST RECORD CARD. NUMBER SEVEN IS RETRIEVE THE 
4 CARD UPON COMPLETION OF A PRINTOUT. NUMBER EIGHT IS TURN OFF 
5 THE INSTRUMENT AND RECORD THE TIME. IT WALKS YOU RIGHT 
6 THROUGH THE STEPS. 
7 Q DOES IT HAVE RIGHT DOWN THE TIME YOU DID THAT TEST? 
8 A YES. THE TIME THE TEST WAS TAKEN, 0042. 42 
9 MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT. 
10 Q 42 MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT? 
11 A YES. 
12 Q HOW LONG AFTER THE ARREST? 
13 A I MADE NOTE ON HERE AT THE TOP OF THAT. BAKER WAS 
14 AT 20 MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT. 
15 Q AND WHEN WAS IT YOU SAW THE DEFENDANT BEHIND THE 
16 WHEEL WHEN THE VEHICLE MOVED FORWARD? 
17 A HE WAS -- WHEN I APPROACHED HIM BEHIND THE WHEEL 
18 WAS SIX MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT ON THE DISPATCH LOG. 
19 Q SO IT WAS A LITTLE MORE THAN A HALF HOUR OF THAT 
20 THAT YOU GAVE HIM THE TEST? 
21 A YES. 36 MINUTES. 
22 Q NOW, SHOWING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S 
23 EXHIBIT NO. 2, WHAT IS THAT? 
24 A THIS IS THE TEST CARD THAT IT ASKS YOU TO INSERT 




2 Q AND DOES THAT SHOW ANYTHING BESIDES JUST THE TEST 
3 RESULTS? 
4 A YES, IT DOES. 
5 Q WHAT ELSE DOES IT SHOW? 
6 A IT RUNS THROUGH A SERIES OF INTERNAL TESTS TO 
7 DETERMINE THAT IT'S IN PROPER WORKING ORDER. IT DOES SOME 
8 TESTS ON ITSELF BEFORE OBTAINING A BREATH SAMPLE FROM THE 
9 SUBJECT. IT PRINTS OUT THOSE RESULTS. IT THEN PRINTS OUT THE 
10 TEST RESULTS OF THE SAME PULLING INTO THE MACHINE. 
11 Q OKAY. SO IT'S GOT WHERE IT SAYS TEST, THEN AIR 
12 BLANK, INTERNAL ONE, INTERNAL TWO, INTERNAL THREE, AND AIR 
13 BLANK. WHAT ARE THOSE THINGS? 
14 A OKAY. THE AIR BLANK IS, IT TESTS IT TO MAKE SURE 
15 THE AIR INSIDE IT IS CLEAN. AND IT SHOWS ZERO, ZERO, ZERO, 
16 TEN. THEN IT DOES THREE INTERNAL TESTS, THEN THE RESULTS, AND 
17 RECORDS THE TIME. 
18 Q AND DOES THAT ALL INDICATE IT WAS WORKING PROPERLY? 
19 A YES. 
20 Q AND THEN IT HAS AFTER THE AIR BLANK INTERNAL ONE, 
21 INTERNAL TWO, AND INTERNAL THREE, AIR BLANK. THEN IT HAS 
22 SUBJECT TEST. AND WITHOUT GIVING THE RESULT, WHAT DOES THAT 
23 MEAN? 
24 A THE SUBJECT TEST? 
25 Q YES. 
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1 A THAT IS REFERRING TO THE PERSON BLOWING INTO THE 
2 MACHINE. THEN IT WILL PRINT THE RESULTS OF THE TEST. 
3 Q SO THE NUMBER BY SUBJECT TEST IS THE RESULT OF THE 
4 BREATH TEST GIVEN ON THE DEFENDANT, JAMES IVIE? 
5 A YES, IT IS. 
6 Q THEN THE AIR BLANK, WAS THAT --
7 A IT CLEANED ITSELF OUT. AND YOU MAKE SURE IT IS 
8 CLEAN AGAIN. 
9 Q OKAY. SO DID YOU PERFORM THAT TEST ACCORDING TO 
10 YOUR TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE? 
11 A YES, I DID. 
12 Q AND WITH AN OBJECT IN VIEW TO GET THE CORRECT 
13 BREATH ALCOHOL CONTENT OF THE DEFENDANT? 
14 A YES. 
15 Q NOW, AFTER DOING THE TEST WITH THE DEFENDANT, 
16 GETTING THE RESULT THAT YOU HAVE BEFORE --IS THE RESULT ON 
17 THAT CARD? 
18 A YES, IT IS. 
19 Q THEN WHAT DID YOU DO? 
20 A I THEN READ HIM HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
21 Q THAT'S WHERE HE HAS A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND 
22 THE OTHER RIGHTS? 
23 A YES. IN FACT, PART OF THE DUI FORM, THAT FORM WITH 
24 -- I SAID WE HAD TO READ WORD FOR WORD, IT HAS THE MIRANDA 
25 RIGHTS WRITTEN THERE. AS WE READ THERE WE NOTE THE TIME AND 
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1 CHECK THEM AS WE READ THEM TO THE SUBJECT TO SHOW THAT WE READ 
2 THEM PROPERLY THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THEIR RIGHTS. 
3 Q AND DID YOU READ THEM TO HIM PROPERLY? 
4 A YES, I DID. 
5 Q WOULD YOU TELL US WHETHER OR NOT HE INDICATED HE 
6 UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS? 
7 A YES. I ASKED HIM, AFTER READING HIM HIS MIRANDA 
8 RIGHTS I ASKED, "DO YOU UNDERSTAND EACH OF THESE RIGHTS I 
9 EXPLAINED TO YOU?" 
10 HIS RESPONSE WAS, "YEP." 
11 Q DID YOU ASK HIM ANOTHER QUESTION? 
12 A I ASKED HIM, "HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU 
13 WISH TO TALK TO ME NOW?" 
14 HIS RESPONSE WAS, "GO AHEAD." 
15 Q ABOUT WHAT TIME WAS IT THAT YOU DID THESE THINGS? 
16 A THIS WAS AT, I MADE NOTE OF THE TIME ON THE REPORT 
17 AT 0045. SO 45 MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT. 
18 Q AFTER MIDNIGHT? 
19 A IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE TEST. 
20 Q 23RD OF MARCH? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q REAL EARLY SATURDAY MORNING? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q OKAY. AND WHERE WAS THIS DONE? 
25 A THIS WAS DONE IN ROOSEVELT POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
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1 RIGHT NEXT TO THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE THERE IS A TABLE, AND 
2 JUST SITTING DOWN THERE. 
3 Q WHO WAS PRESENT? 
4 A MYSELF, MR. IVIE, AND I BELIEVE KEN PURDY WAS THERE 
5 ALSO. 
6 Q AND WHAT QUESTIONS DID YOU ASK THE DEFENDANT? YOU 
7 MAY WANT TO REFER TO YOUR REPORT TO GET THIS EXACT. AND WHAT 
8 WERE HIS RESPONSES TO YOU? 
9 A THE DUI REPORT FORM HAS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR US 
10 TO ASK. I USUALLY JUST GO FOLLOW IT WORD FOR WORD. ON THE 
11 FIRST QUESTION I ASK WAS, "WERE YOU OPERATING A VEHICLE?" 
12 Q AND WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE WORD FOR WORD? 
13 A HE SAID, "PULLED FROM THE GAS PUMPS UP TO CIRCLE 
14 K." 
15 Q AND THEN WHAT DID YOU ASK HIM? 
16 A I ASKED HIM, "WHERE WERE YOU GOING?" 
17 Q WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE? 
18 A HIS RESPONSE WAS, "BACK TO CHRISTINE'S HOUSE." 
19 Q THEN WHAT DID YOU ASK HIM? 
20 A I ASKED HIM, "WHERE DID YOU START FROM?" 
21 Q AND WHAT DID HE RESPOND? 
22 A HE RESPONDED, "FROM HER HOUSE." 
23 Q THEN TELL US WHAT WAS ASKED AND WHAT WAS RESPONDED 
24 AFTER THAT. 
25 A OKAY. I ASKED HIM WHEN HE LEFT. 
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1 HE SAID, "JUST BEFORE YOU PULLED US OVER." 
2 UM, I THEN ASKED HIM WHAT TIME IT WAS. 
3 HE SAID, "12:30, PROBABLY." 
4 I ASKED HIM WHAT THE DATE WAS. 
5 HE SAID, "MARCH 22ND." 
6 I ASKED HIM WHAT DAY OF WEEK IT WAS. 
7 HE SAID, "FRIDAY." 
8 Q NOW, THE ACTUAL TIME IS ABOUT WHAT, 20 MINUTES OFF? 
9 A YES. IT WAS AT THAT TIME I MADE NOTE THE TIME WAS 
10 0050. 
11 Q ALL RIGHT. 
12 A 10 MINUTES TO ONE. THE DATE WAS THE 23RD, JUST 
13 THE, YOU KNOW, THE NEXT MORNING. IT WAS SATURDAY. I ASKED 
14 HIM, "WHAT CITY OR COUNTY ARE YOU IN NOW?" 
15 HE SAID, "ROOSEVELT. DUCHESNE COUNTY. ROOSEVELT 
16 POLICE DEPARTMENT." 
17 I ASKED HIM, "WHAT WERE YOU DOING DURING THE LAST 
18 THREE HOURS?" 
19 HE SAID, "RIDING BACK FROM PARK CITY." 
2 0 I THEN ASKED HIM, "HAVE YOU BEEN DRINKING?" 
21 HE SAID, "WHEN I GOT BACK." 
22 I THEN ASKED, "WHAT DID YOU DRINK?" 
23 HE SAID, "BEER." 
24 I ASKED HIM, HOW MUCH BEER DID YOU HAVE TO DRINK?" 
25 HE SAID, "A COUPLE OF BEERS." 
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1 I ASKED HIM, "WHERE DID YOU DRINK THESE?" 
2 HE STATED, "AT CHRISTINE'S HOUSE." 
3 I ASKED HIM WHEN HE HAD HIS FIRST DRINK. AND HE 
4 SAID IT WAS ABOUT 10 O'CLOCK THAT NIGHT. 
5 THEN I ASKED HIM WHEN HE HAD HIS LAST DRINK. HE 
6 STATED TO ME THAT IT WAS 30 MINUTES BEFORE I PULLED HIM OVER. 
7 Q WHAT DID YOU ASK THEN? 
8 A I ASKED HIM THE QUESTION, ARE YOU UNDER THE 
9 INFLUENCE OF AN ALCOHOL BEVERAGE NOW?" 
10 AND HE STATED TO ME, "NO, I DON'T THINK SO." 
11 Q WHAT DID YOU ASK THEN? 
12 A I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS TAKING ANY TRANQUILIZER PILLS 
13 OR MEDICINE OR PILLS OR ANY DRUGS OF ANY KIND. HE STATED NO. 
14 I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS SICK OR ILL. AND HE SAID, NO, HE 
15 WASN'T. THAT'S ALL THE QUESTIONS I ASKED HIM. 
16 Q SO WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
17 A THAT'S ALL THAT WE DID AT THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. I 
18 BELIEVE LEONARD ISACCSON BROUGHT UP THE IMPOUND SLIP TO US. 
19 HE DONE THE IMPOUND. TOLD ME WHAT HE HAD FOUND IN THE 
20 VEHICLE. THEN JIMMY WAS TRANSPORTED TO DUCHESNE, I BELIEVE, 
21 AND BOOKED INTO JAIL THERE. 
22 MR. GILLESPIE: OKAY. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
23 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. GOLD: 




Partial Transcript of Defendant's Testimony 
1 Q DID YOU EVER TELL HIM THAT YOU HAD DRIVEN THE 
2 VEHICLE THAT EVENING? 
3 A NO, I DID NOT. 
4 Q WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM? 
5 A I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD CAME FROM KRISTIN'S TO 
6 CIRCLE K, AND WE WERE JUST GOING BACK TO HER HOUSE TO TRY --
7 AND I WAS STILL TRYING TO KEEP THE JEEP OUT OF IMPOUND, I 
8 GUESS. THAT WAS THE STORY I STARTED WITH. 
9 Q DID YOU EVER TELL HIM THAT YOU DROVE THE VEHICLE? 
10 A NO, I NEVER SAID I DROVE THE VEHICLE. 
11 Q DID YOU EVER TELL HIM YOU DROVE THE VEHICLE FROM 
12 THE GAS PUMPS TO THE CURB? 
13 A NO. 
14 Q AND WHEN YOU WERE TALKING TO TROOPER MARX AT THE 
15 POLICE STATION, WHERE WAS KRISTIN? 
16 A WITHIN THAT DISTANCE THERE. 
17 Q DID YOU PLEAD WITH TROOPER MARX AGAIN TO GIVE YOU A 
18 BREAK AT THE POLICE STATION? 
19 A I WAS GETTING RATHER ANGRY BY THEN, THE WHOLE MESS. 
20 WASN'T PLEADING REALLY TO GIVE ME A BREAK, MORE LIKE DEMANDING 
21 HIM TO GIVE ME A BREAK. IT WAS --IT WAS WRONG. 
22 Q DID YOU LET HIM KNOW THAT? 
23 A YEAH. I LET HIM KNOW THAT IT WAS WRONG. IT WAS A 
24 CROCK. 
25 Q DID YOU MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO HIM WHAT YOU 
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1 THOUGHT OF HIS CONDUCT THAT EVENING IN ARRESTING YOU? 
2 A YES. 
3 Q DID YOU MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO HIM THAT YOU HAD 
4 NOT BEEN DRIVING THE VEHICLE THAT EVENING? 
5 A YES. I TOLD HIM I HAD NOT DROVE THE JEEP. 
6 Q NOW, WHEN YOU ARRIVED AT THE POLICE STATION, DID 
7 YOU HAVE THE KEYS TO THE CAR WITH YOU? 
8 A NO, I DID NOT. 
9 Q DID YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THE KEYS OF THE CAR 
10 AT THAT POINT? 
11 A NO. 
12 Q DID -- WERE YOU SEARCHED WHEN YOU WERE ARRESTED? 
13 A I'M SURE I WAS. AFTER -- PROBABLY AFTER WE GOT 
14 BACK TO THE POLICE STATION. 
15 Q DO YOU RECALL IF ANY KEYS WERE FOUND ON YOU DURING 
16 THAT SEARCH? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q TROOPER MARX HAS STATED THAT THE ENGINE WAS RUNNING 
19 AT THE CIRCLE K. WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THAT? 
20 A NO WAY. ENGINE WAS NOT RUNNING. 
21 Q TROOPER MARX SAYS THE VEHICLE MOVED. WHAT DO YOU 
22 SAY TO THAT? 
23 A NO. IT NEVER MOVED. DEFINITELY NOT. 
24 MR. GOLD: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 




2 BY MR. GILLESPIE: 
3 Q TROOPER MARX SAID WHAT HE SAID, OFFICER ISACCSON 
4 SAID THE VEHICLE MOVED TWO TO THREE FEET. IT DID NOT? 
5 A DID NOT. 
6 Q KENNETH PURDY SAID THAT IT WAS RUNNING BECAUSE THE 
7 EXHAUST WAS CLEARLY VISIBLE? 
8 A NO WAY. IF IT WAS CLEARLY RUNNING IT WOULD HAVE 
9 BEEN CLEARLY HE COULD HAVE HEARD tT TOO. THE EXHAUST ON MY 
10 JEEP COMES UP OUT THE OUTSIDE, RIGHT UNDERNEATH THE DOORS ON 
11 IT. 
12 Q UNDERNEATH THE DOORS? 
13 A BETWEEN THE TIRES ON T&E SIDE OF THE VEHICLE LIKE A 
14 SIDE PIPE. 
15 Q DIDN'T YOU TELL TROOPER MARX THAT YOU DROVE THE 
16 VEHICLE? 
17 A NO, I DID NOT. 
18 Q NOT AT ANY TIME? 
19 A I DID NOT DRIVE THE VEHICLE AFTER I HAD BEEN 
20 DRINKING AT KRISTIN'S HOUSE. 
21 Q SHOWING YOU WHAT'S BEElg MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 
22 S, TURN TO THIS SECTION MARKED INTERVIEW. DO YOU RECALL BEING 
22 J?EAD YOUR MIRANDA RIGHTS AT THE STATION? 
24 MR. GOLD: YOUR HONOR, I AM GOING TO OBJECT TO 
25 T?HIS. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE THAT HE'S SUBMITTING THE UNSIGNED 
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1 DOCUMENT TO MY CLIENT? HE'S ASKING --
2 MR. GILLESPIE: I DON'T THINK THAT'S AN UNSIGNED 
3 DOCUMENT. 
4 MR. GOLD: CERTAINLY UNSIGNED BY MY CLIENT. 
5 MR. GILLESPIE: I GUESS TO GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO 
6 COMMENT ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN INTERVIEW WITH HIM. IT'S 
7 ALREADY BEEN TESTIFIED. 
8 MR. GOLD: IS THIS A DOCUMENT IN EVIDENCE THAT YOU 
9 ARE SUBMITTING TO? 
10 MR. GILLESPIE: WELL, IT'S MARKED. 
11 THE COURT: IT HASN'T BEEN RECEIVED. IT'S NOT HIS 
12 DOCUMENT. YOU CAN GIVE IT TO HIM TO REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION 
13 EVEN THOUGH IT'S NOT HIS. BUT HE'S ALREADY TESTIFIED THAT HE 
14 DIDN'T SAY THAT. I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE IS MUCH POINT IN 
15 GOING OVER THE DOCUMENT ITSELF. HOWEVER, YOU CAN HAVE HIM 
16 REVIEW IT. 
17 Q (BY MR. GILLESPIE) OKAY. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THAT 
18 SECTION MARKED "INTERVIEW"? 
19 A YES. 
20 Q DO YOU RECALL BEING READ THOSE RIGHTS, MIRANDA 
21 RIGHTS? 
22 A YES, I WAS READ MY RIGHTS. 
23 Q DO YOU RECALL BEING READ THOSE QUESTIONS THAT ARE 
24 THERE, LIKE, WERE YOU OPERATING A VEHICLE? 
25 A I DID NOT WANT TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS TO START 
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1 WITH BECAUSE I HAVE A RIGHT TO HAVE MY ATTORNEY PRESENT, AFTER 
2 HE DID READ ME SOME QUESTIONS. 
3 Q OKAY. JUST BEFORE THOSE QUESTIONS, DO YOU SEE ONE 
4 AND TWO? FIRST THERE IS THE FOUR STATEMENTS OF MIRANDA. AND 
5 THEN WERE THE FOLLOWING WAIVER QUESTION ASKED, DO YOU 
6 UNDERSTAND EACH OF THESE RIGHTS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU? DID 
7 YOU ANSWER YUP TO THAT? 
8 A YES, PROBABLY, IF I ANSWERED TO IT. 
9 Q OKAY. THEN THE SECOND ONE, "HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN 
10 MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK TO US NOW?" 
11 RESPONSE: DID YOU RESPOND, "GO AHEAD"? 
12 A NO, I DON'T BELIEVE SO. 
13 Q SO YOU DON'T RECALL THE OFFICER ASKING YOU A 
14 SPECIFIC QUESTION, THEN YOU GIVING A SPECIFIC ANSWER, AND HIM 
15 WRITING IT DOWN? 
16 A NO. I DID NOT WANT TO ANSWER ANY OF HIS QUESTIONS 
17 AFTER I KNEW I WAS BEING BOOKED IN FOR A DUI. 
18 Q YOU DIDN'T ANSWER GO AHEAD AFTER BEING READ YOUR 
19 RIGHTS? 
20 A I MIGHT HAVE SAID GO AHEAD AND ASK YOUR QUESTIONS 
21 IF YOU WANT, YOU MIGHT NOT GET A REPLY. 
22 Q BUT YOU DIDN'T GIVE THESE REPLIES THAT ARE MARKED 
23 BY THE QUESTIONS ON THAT SHEET? 
24 A I -- I DID ANSWER SOME QUESTIONS WHEN I WAS IN 
25 THERE, BUT I NEVER DID SAY THAT I DROVE THE VEHICLE. 
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1 Q DO YOU RECALL BEING ASKED, WERE YOU OPERATING A 
2 VEHICLE? 
3 A AND I SAID NO. 
4 Q DO YOU RECALL BEING ASKED, WHERE WERE YOU GOING? 
5 A WE WERE GOING TO CIRCLE K. 
6 Q AND ON DOWN THE LIST, WHERE DID YOU START FROM? 
7 WHEN? WHAT DAY IS IT? HAVE YOU BEEN DRINKING? WHAT? HOW 
8 MUCH? AND SEVERAL OTHER QUESTIONS. DO YOU RECALL THOSE? 
9 A I REMEMBER WHEN HE ASKED ME WHAT TIME IT WAS, 
10 BECAUSE THERE WAS A CLOCK RIGHT BEHIND HIM. 
11 Q DO YOU REMEMBER BEING ASKED, WHERE WERE YOU, WHAT 
12 WERE YOU DOING DURING THE LAST THREE HOURS? 
13 A I HAD BEEN AT KRISTIN'S HOUSE. 
14 Q DO YOU RECALL ANSWERING, RIDING BACK FROM PARK 
15 CITY? 
16 A THAT WAS PREVIOUS, BEFORE THAT. THREE HOURS I HAD 
17 BEEN COMING BACK FROM PARK CITY. 
18 Q NOW, WHEN YOU PULLED UP TO THE GAS PUMPS, YOU WERE 
19 WORRIED WHEN YOU SAW THE TWO POLICE CARS? 
20 A YES, SIR. 
21 Q AND SO WHEN OFFICER --OR WHEN TROOPER MARX CAME UP 
22 TO THE SIDE OF THE CAR, YOU WERE IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT? 
23 A YES, SIR. AND HE CAME UP TO THE JEEP. I WAS OVER 
24 IN THE DRIVER'S SIDE OF THE JEEP. 
25 Q AND WHAT WERE YOU WORRIED ABOUT AT THAT TIME? 
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1 A THE LICENSE PLATE WAS EXPIRED ON THE JEEP. 
2 Q YOU WEREN'T WORRIED ABOUT DUI? 
3 A NO, BECAUSE I WAS NOT DRIVING. 
4 Q WHAT WERE YOU DOING IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT? 
5 A I WAS TRYING TO GET OUT OF VIEW. I FIGURED THE 
6 OFFICERS WOULD BE COMING OUT OF THE STORE BEFORE KRISTIN WAS, 
7 THEY WAS THERE WHEN WE SHOWED UP. 
8 Q SO YOU WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE OFFICERS AS EARLY AS 
9 OUT AT THE PUMP? 
10 A YES, SIR. 
11 Q BUT, THEN, AFTER YOU ALREADY PULLED UP TO THE ALLEY 
12 BY CIRCLE K, YOU WOULD GET OUT OF THE PASSENGER SIDE AND GO 
13 AROUND AND SIT IN THE DRIVER'S SIDE BECAUSE YOU WERE WORRIED 
14 ABOUT THE OFFICERS? 
15 A I WASN'T SITTING IN THE DRIVER'S SIDE OF THE JEEP. 
16 MY FEET WAS ON THE GROUND. I WAS ADJUSTING THINGS IN THE BACK 
17 OF THE JEEP. THE JEEP WASN'T RUNNING. I MEAN, THERE IS NO 
18 WAY I COULD GET A DUI WITHOUT THE VEHICLE RUNNING OR MOVING OR 
19 SOMETHING. 
20 Q NOW, DO YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE SET OF KEYS TO THAT 
21 CAR? 
22 A NO, SIR. 
23 Q JUST ONE SET? 
24 A ONE SET. 
25 Q DOES IT RUN WITHOUT THE KEYS IN IT? 
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1 A NO, SIR. 
2 Q NOW, WHEN TROOPER MARX GOT YOU OUTSIDE THE JEEP TO, 
3 I GUESS YOU DID SOME FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS, WHERE WAS KRISTIN 
4 AT THIS TIME? 
5 A IN THE PASSENGER SEAT OP THE JEEP WHEN HIM AND 
6 OFFICER ISACCSON CAME UP TO THE JEEP? 
7 Q OKAY. WHEN TROOPER MARX CAME UP TO YOUR SIDE, 
8 ISACCSON CAME UP TO THE PASSENGER SIDE? 
9 A YEAH. 
10 Q OKAY. NOW, AFTER YOU GOT OUT OF THE VEHICLE, WHAT 
11 -- WHERE WAS KRISTIN? 
12 A SHE WAS IN THE JEEP FOR A MINUTE, THEN SHE GOT OUT 
13 BEFORE WE HAD STARTED THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS WHILE I WAS 
14 DOING THE PORTABLE BREATHILYZER. 
15 Q YOU WERE HERE WHEN TROOPER MARX TESTIFIED THAT --
16 WASN'T THE PORTABLE BREATH TEST GIVEN AFTER THE OTHER SOBRIETY 
17 TEST? 
18 A NO, IT WAS BEFORE. 
19 Q WAS IT BEFORE? 
20 A (WITNESS NODDED HEAD AFFIRMATIVELY.) 
21 Q NOW, WHEN WAS THAT LICENSE PLATE BENT OVER TO 
22 CONCEAL THE REGISTRATION DATE? 
23 A PREVIOUS. I DON'T KNOW. 
24 Q WASN'T DONE THERE? 
25 A (WITNESS SHOOK HEAD NEGATIVELY.) 
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1 Q OKAY. DO YOU RECALL BEING HERE WHEN KRISTIN 
2 TESTIFIED AND SAID THERE WAS A FRIENDLY ATTITUDE BETWEEN YOU 
3 AND THE TROOPER MARX? 
4 A TO START WITH, THERE PROBABLY WAS, BECAUSE I WAS 
5 PROBABLY TRYING TO BE AS NICE AS POSSIBLE TO HIM BECAUSE I 
6 DIDN'T THINK HE LIKED ME. 
7 Q YOU THINK HE HELD A GRUDGE STILL FROM FIFTH GRADE? 
8 A NOT FIFTH GRADE. EIGHTH OR 9TH GRADE. 
9 Q EIGHTH OR 9TH GRADE? YOU THINK HE STILL HELD THAT 
10 GRUDGE? 
11 A EVIDENTLY. 
12 Q DO YOU RECALL WHEN HE ASKED YOU HOW MUCH YOU HAD 
13 HAD TO DRINK, SAYING, I HAVE HAD A COUPLE BEERS, BUT I AM ONLY 
14 GOING A COUPLE BLOCKS. WE'LL PARK THE JEEP AND NOT GO ANY 
15 MORE, OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT? 
16 A I TOLD HIM WE WERE ONLY GOING A COUPLE BLOCKS. 
17 Q DO YOU RECALL KRISTIN SAYING THAT THIS WAS HER 
18 FAULT? 
19 A YES. SHE WAS PRETTY FRAZZLED ABOUT IT. SHE WAS 
20 BLAMING IT ON HERSELF BECAUSE WE LEFT. AND SHE DIDN'T 
21 UNDERSTAND HOW I HAD GOT OVER IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT, I DON'T 
22 THINK. WHEN SHE CAME OUT OF THE STORE SHE WAS PRETTY SHOCKED 
23 THAT I WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE JEEP. 
24 MR. GILLESPIE: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 




Partial Transcript of Trooper Marx's Testimony on Rebuttal 
1 ARE NOT RELEVANT FOR THE REASON THAT THE EXHIBIT IS BEING 
2 OFFERED AT THIS TIME. THERE IS NO OTHER INFERENCE FROM THAT. 
3 THIS PART OF IT WAS NOT RELEVANT TO WHAT THE STATE IS TRYING 
4 TO DO IN INTRODUCING THIS PIECE OF EVIDENCE AT THIS TIME. IT 
5 DOESN'T MEAN ANYTHING ELSE. SO YOU MAY CONTINUE. AND THE 
6 EXHIBIT IS NO. 9 IS RECEIVED. 
7 Q (BY MR. GILLESPIE) OKAY. TROOPER MARX, SHOWING 
8 YOU THE EXHIBIT 9, WHAT IS IT? 
9 A IT IS -- IT'S PART OF A DUI REPORT FORM. THIS IS 
10 ON THE DUI REPORT FORM. WE GO THROUGH IT WORD-FOR-WORD. THIS 
11 IS ONE OF THE PAGES ON THERE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE BREATH 
12 TEST. 
13 Q OKAY. SO THIS IS A PORTION OF YOUR DUI REPORT? 
14 A YES, IT IS. 
15 Q WHEN WAS THAT REPORT DONE? 
16 A THIS PORTION? OR THE REPORT? THE REPORT WAS 
17 FILLED OUT HERE AT ROOSEVELT POLICE DEPARTMENT. UPON BRINGING 
18 MR. IVIE TO THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE REPORT WAS STARTED. 
19 Q DO YOU KNOW WHEN IT WAS COMPLETED? 
2 0 A IT WAS COMPLETED -- I THINK I MADE A NOTE AT 1:30 
21 THAT MORNING. THE REPORT WAS SIGNED. AND THE TIME WAS 
22 INITIALED ON THERE ON THE REPORT AT 1:30, OR 1:30 A.M. THE 
23 23RD OF MARCH. 
24 Q OKAY. SO THE ENTIRE REPORT, INCLUDING THE PORTION 




2 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
3 Q BUT THAT PORTION THAT YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU HAD 
4 ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED ALSO BY 1:30 ON THE 23RD, RIGHT? 
5 A THAT'S RIGHT. IN FACT, THIS PORTION HAS A TIME 
6 WHEN IT WAS STARTED TO BE FILLED OUT. 
7 Q WHEN WAS THAT? 
8 A AT 0045. THREE MINUTES AFTER THE INTOXILYZER I 
9 BEGAN THIS PORTION OF THE REPORT. 
10 Q BY THE WAY, WHILE I AM REMEMBERING THAT, DID YOU 
11 TURN ON THE INTOXILYZER? 
12 A YES, I TURNED ON THE INTOXILYZER, CHECKED THE BOX. 
13 Q OKAY. NOW, THAT PORTION OF THE REPORT YOU HAVE 
14 THERE, HOW DOES IT BEGIN? WHAT IS IT? 
15 A IT LABELS THE INTERVIEW. THEN IT SAYS, WAS SUBJECT 
16 ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS. I PUT, YES. THE TIME, BY 
17 WHOM AND WHERE AT. I FILLED IN THOSE BLANKS BY ME AT 
18 ROOSEVELT POLICE DEPARTMENT. AND THEN I BEGIN READING THE 
19 SUBJECT HIS RIGHTS. 
20 Q AND WHAT DO THE CHECK MARKS INDICATE? 
21 A I CHECK IT. I READ HIM LIKE --
22 Q EACH OF THESE THINGS WITH THE CHECK MARK, WHAT DOES 
23 THAT MEAN? 
24 A THAT INDICATES THAT I DID, IN FACT, READ IT. I 
25 READ IT OUT LOUD. CHECK THE BLANK, OPEN UP THE NEXT ONE, NEXT 
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1 PART OF MIRANDA. IT ENSURES THAT WE DON'T SKIP A PORTION OF 
2 THE MIRANDA, THAT HE IS PROPERLY INFORMED OF HIS MIRANDA 
3 RIGHTS. 
4 Q OKAY. NOW, THEN, I NOTE THAT THERE'S A SERIES OF 
5 QUESTIONS AND HANDWRITTEN RESPONSES. COULD YOU EXPLAIN HOW 
6 THAT WENT. 
7 A YES. THESE QUESTIONS ON THE DUI REPORT FORM, I 
8 START AT THIS TOP, GO DOWN THE LIST. WHEN A SUBJECT ANSWERS 
9 THE QUESTION, I PUT EXACTLY WHAT THAT SUBJECT SAYS. I DON'T 
10 CHANGE IT, ANY DRAMATICS, INCOMPLETE SENTENCE TO COMPLETE 
11 SENTENCE. I PUT WORD FOR WORD WHAT THAT PERSON SAYS BECAUSE 
12 IT IS HIS STATEMENT. AND I DON'T KNOW, ASSUME HE MEANT 
13 ANYTHING OR ASSUME THAT -- I PUT WHAT IS SAID TO ME. WHAT I 
14 VERBALLY HEAR IS WHAT I WRITE AFTER THE QUESTION HAS BEEN 
15 ASKED WHETHER IT MAKES SENSE OR NOT. 
16 Q AND ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED AFTER THE 
17 MIRANDA WAS GIVEN? 
18 A YES. I STARTED AT THE TOP, READ HIM HIS RIGHTS. 
19 THEN I ASKED HIM IF HE UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS. ASKED HIM IF HE 
20 WISHED TO TALK TO ME NOW. IT HAS A RESPONSE AND I PUT EXACTLY 
21 WHAT HIS RESPONSE IS. 
22 Q DID YOU ASK ALL THE QUESTIONS AND THEN PUT IN ALL 
23 THE RESPONSES? 
24 A YES. 
25 Q OR DID YOU DO IT QUESTION, ANSWER, QUESTION, 
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1 ANSWER? IN OTHER WORDS, DID YOU ASK IT ALL THEN GO BACK AND 
2 REMEMBER? 
3 A NO. YOU ASK A QUESTION, WAIT FOR THEIR RESPONSE, I 
4 WRITE THEIR RESPONSE, MOVE ON TO THE NEXT QUESTION. 
5 Q SO BY THE TIME YOU GET TO THE NEXT, SECOND 
6 QUESTION, YOU HAD ALREADY WRITTEN THE RESPONSE TO THE FIRST 
7 QUESTION? 
8 A EXACTLY WORD-FOR-WORD WHAT HE TOLD ME. 
9 Q OKAY. WHEN YOU ASKED HIM, WERE YOU OPERATING A 
10 VEHICLE, WHAT DID HE TELL YOU? 
11 A HE SAID, PULL FROM GAS PUMPS UP TO CIRCLE K. 
12 Q AND WHEN YOU ASKED HIM, WHERE WERE YOU GOING, WHAT 
13 DID HE RESPOND? 
14 A RESPONDED, "BACK TO KRISTIN'S HOUSE." 
15 Q AND WHEN YOU ASKED HIM, WHERE DID YOU START FROM, 
16 WHAT DID HE SAY? 
17 A HE SAID FROM HER HOUSE. 
18 Q AND WHEN YOU ASKED WHEN? 
19 A HE HE SAID, JUST BEFORE YOU PULLED US OVER. 
20 Q AND THEN THERE IS SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT TIME AND 
21 DATE AND WHERE YOU ARE. WHEN YOU ASKED HIM, WHAT WERE YOU 
22 DOING DURING THE LAST THREE HOURS, WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE? 
23 A HE STATED, "RIDING BACK FROM PARK CITY." 
24 Q WHEN YOU ASKED HIM, HAVE YOU BEEN DRINKING, WHAT 
25 WAS HIS RESPONSE? 
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1 A "WHEN I GOT BACK." 
2 Q WHAT? 
3 A "BEER." 
4 Q HOW MUCH? 
5 A "A COUPLE BEERS." 
6 Q "WHEN DID YOU HAVE YOUR FIRST DRINK?" 
7 A "ABOUT 10 O'CLOCK TONIGHT." 
8 Q "LAST DRINK?" 
9 A "30 MINUTES BEFORE YOU PULLED US OVER." 
10 Q "ARE YOU UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF AN ALCOHOLIC 
11 BEVERAGE OR DRUGS?" 
12 A JUST ALCOHOL, BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT WAS IN QUESTION. 
13 Q NOW --
14 A "NO, I DON'T THINK SO." 
15 Q WHEN YOU ASKED, ARE YOU TAKING TRANQUILIZER PILLS, 
16 MEDICINE, OR DRUGS OF ANY KIND, WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q AND WHEN YOU ASKED, ARE YOU ILL? 
19 A NO. 
20 Q AND HOW CAREFUL WERE YOU TO SEE THAT IT WAS HIS 
21 EXACT WORDS? 
22 A I MAKE SURE THAT THAT IS, THAT'S HIS STATEMENT. 
23 THAT'S -- YOU KNOW, I ASK AT THE VERY BEGINNING, "HAVING THESE 
24 RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK TO ME NOW?" IF THEY SAY I 
25 WANT MY LAWYER OR THEY DON'T RESPOND, I WRITE ACROSS THIS 
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1 WHOLE FORM "NO INTERVIEW." I CAN ONLY ASK THOSE QUESTIONS IF 
2 THEY AGREE. HE SAID, GO AHEAD. 
3 I STARTED AT THE BEGINNING. AND I WRITE 
4 WORD-FOR-WORD WHAT HE SAYS. IF HE SAID AN OBSCENITY OR TOLD 
5 ME WHERE TO GO, I PUT EXACTLY WHAT IS SAID. AND THEN, I MEAN, 
6 THAT WAS HIS EXACT WORDS THAT NIGHT. AND IF HE WOULD HAVE 
7 SAID THAT HE WASN'T DRIVING, IT WOULD BE WROTE DOWN THERE. 
8 THAT IS HIS WORDS. 
9 Q DID HE EVER TELL YOU THAT NIGHT HE WASN'T DRIVING? 
10 A NOT ONCE DID HE TELL ME THAT NIGHT. 
11 Q AND DID KRISTIN EVER TELL YOU THAT NIGHT THAT SHE 
12 WAS DRIVING? 
13 A NO. AND THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A PERFECT 
14 OPPORTUNITY, YOU KNOW, WHEN I MIRANDIZE HIM, MAKE SURE HE 
15 UNDERSTANDS HIS RIGHTS. THEN I ASKED HIM, WERE YOU OPERATING 
16 A VEHICLE? AND IT SEEMS TO ME HE WOULD HAVE SAID, NO, I 
17 WASN'T IF, IN FACT, HE WASN'T. BUT HE SAID, "I PULLED FROM 
18 THE GAS PUMPS UP TO CIRCLE K." 
19 MR. GILLESPIE: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
20 THE COURT: MR. GOLD. 
21 THE COURT: WAIT A MINUTE. WE MIGHT NEED THAT FOR 
22 MR. GOLD'S QUESTION. HE HAD HANDED THE EXHIBIT TO THE JURY. 
23 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR, GQLP; 




Transcript of Trial Court's Ruling 
1 THE BENCH WITH COUNSEL? 
2 THE COURT: SURE. 
3 (WHEREUPON A SIDE BAR CONFERENCE WAS HELD) 
4 THE COURT: LET ME EXCUSE THE JURY FOR A MINUTE. WE 
5 ARE GOING TO BE A MINUTE. 
6 THE RECORD WILL INDICATE THE JURY IS NOT HERE. AT 
7 THE BENCH, MR. GILLESPIE SAID HE INTENDED TO INTRODUCE EXHIBIT 
8 NO. 9. AND I AM INCLINED TO DO THAT UNDER THE FOLLOWING: 
9 HEARSAY IS DESCRIBED AS ANY STATEMENT OTHER THAN MADE BY A 
10 DECLARANT WHILE TESTIFYING AT TRIAL OR HEARING OFFERED IN THE 
11 EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED. A WRITTEN 
12 DOCUMENT IS HEARSAY UNLESS IT COMES IN ANY OTHER EXCEPTION TO 
13 THE HEARSAY RULE. BUT, IN THIS CASE, THE RULE GOES ON TO SAY 
14 STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. 
15 "A STATEMENT IS NOT HEARSAY IF THE DECLARANT 
16 TESTIFIES, WHICH OFFICER MARX HAS, AT THE TRIAL OR HEARING AND 
17 IS SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION CONCERNING THE STATEMENT." 
18 THAT HAS OCCURRED. OFFICER MARX TESTIFIED, AND HE WAS SUBJECT 
19 TO CROSS-EXAMINATION. AND THE STATEMENT, THAT IS, THE 
20 DOCUMENT EXHIBIT 9, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DECLARANTS'S 
21 TESTIMONY AND IS OFFERED TO REBUT AND AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
22 CHARGE AGAINST THE DECLARANT OF RECENT FABRICATION OR IMPROPER 
23 INFLUENCE OR MOTIVE. AND I THINK THAT COMES IN UNDER THAT 
24 RULE. I AM NOT SURE THE WHOLE DOCUMENT COMES IN. 
25 MR. GOLD: IS THAT YOUR RULING, YOUR HONOR? 
329 
<r</</ 
1 THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT WE INDICATED. 
2 MR. GOLD: ALL RIGHT. NOW, I AM GOING TO MAKE MY 
3 OBJECTION RIGHT NOW THAT THAT DOCUMENT IS NOT A STATEMENT OF 
4 THIS WITNESS. THAT DOCUMENT IS A DOCUMENT WHICH HAS BEEN 
5 RECORDED BY THE OFFICER WHO IS OFFERING THE STATEMENT. IT IS 
6 NOT A STATEMENT BY THE WITNESS. THERE IS NOTHING IN THAT RULE 
7 THAT AUTHORIZES THE ADMISSION OF A DOCUMENT NOT PREPARED BY 
8 THE ALLEGED DECLARANT OF THE STATEMENT ITSELF. IF THERE IS A 
9 STATEMENT, A DOCUMENT THAT RELATES TO A STATEMENT MADE BY THIS 
10 INDIVIDUAL AND AN OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT BY THIS INDIVIDUAL, 
11 THAT'S WHAT THAT RELATES TO, YOU COULD GET THAT IN. BUT THAT 
12 DOCUMENT IS NOTHING MORE THAN THE RECORDED PAST -- PAST 
13 RECORDED KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PERSON, NOT THE DECLARATION. IF 
14 YOU ALLOWED THAT IN, ANYBODY COULD WRITE ANYTHING DOWN AND 
15 CLAIM IT WAS THE STATEMENT OF SOMEBODY WHO NEVER MADE IT. 
16 THAT'S THE WHOLE POINT. 
17 IF THAT DOCUMENT WAS SIGNED OR IF THAT DOCUMENT WAS 
18 BY THE DECLARANT OR IF THAT DOCUMENT WAS MADE BY THE 
19 DECLARANT, IT WAS HIS CONFESSION, SIGNED BY HIM OUT-OF-COURT, 
20 THEN YOU COULD ADMIT IT. BUT IT'S NOT. ALL IT IS IS PAST 
21 RECOLLECTION RECORDED. IT'S THE SAME THING AS IF A WITNESS 
22 COMES IN AND STANDS ON THE STAND AND HE TRIES TO TESTIFY FROM 
23 THE DOCUMENT ITSELF, THAT IS OBJECTIONABLE. HE EITHER HAS TO 
24 TESTIFY HIMSELF AS HIS RECOLLECTION IS REFRESHED BY THE 
25 DOCUMENT OR HE CANNOT TESTIFY AND HE CAN SUBMIT THE DOCUMENT. 
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1 WELL, OBVIOUSLY, THIS OFFICER HAS HAD HIS 
2 RECOLLECTION RECORDED. HE'S REVIEWED THE DOCUMENT ANY NUMBER 
3 OF TIMES. IT'S HIS TESTIMONY THAT'S IN THERE. THAT'S WHAT 
4 THAT STATEMENT IS. IT'S HIS TESTIMONY. IT'S NOT THE 
5 DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY. NOW, FOR YOU TO ALLOW THE ADMISSION OF 
6 THAT DOCUMENT AT THIS POINT WHEN HE'S TESTIFIED AFTER HAVING 
7 HIS MEMORY REFRESHED IS CLEARLY ERROR, CLEARLY ERROR. AND 
8 IT'S PREJUDICIAL TO MY CLIENT. AND IT'S CERTAINLY THE BASIS 
9 OF AN APPEAL. 
10 THE COURT: WELL, YOU CERTAINLY HAVE A RIGHT TO AN 
11 APPEAL; EVERYBODY THAT COMES INTO COURT. 
12 MR. GOLD: BUT, JUDGE, YOU KNOW, THAT IS NOT A 
13 STATEMENT. 
14 THE COURT: IT IS NOT A STATEMENT? 
15 MR. GOLD: IT IS NOT A STATEMENT BY MY CLIENT. 
16 THE COURT: I DIDN'T SAY IT WAS A STATEMENT BY YOUR 
17 CLIENT. IT WAS A STATEMENT BY THIS WITNESS. 
18 MR. GOLD: WELL, THAT'S THE EXCEPTION THAT YOU ARE 
19 TALKING ABOUT. 
20 THE COURT: NO. LISTEN. AGAIN, BY THE WAY AN ORAL 
21 IS A STATEMENT OR ORAL ASSERTION SO IT COULD BE IN WRITING. 
22 THE DECLARANT -- TROOPER MARX HAS TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE. HE 
23 IS THE DECLARANT. THE DECLARANT TESTIFIES AT TRIAL OR 
24 HEARING. OFFICER MARX IS NOT TALKING ABOUT YOUR CLIENT AND IS 
25 SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION CONCERNING HIS STATEMENTS. AND 
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1 THIS EXHIBIT, EXHIBIT NO. 9, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
2 DECLARANT'S TESTIMONY. AND IT IS OFFERED BY THE STATE TO 
3 REBUT AND EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CHARGE AGAINST THE DECLARANT OF 
4 RECENT FABRICATION OR IMPROPER INFLUENCE OR MOTIVE. 
5 MR. GOLD: OKAY. READ THAT OF DECLARANT. 
6 DECLARANT IS HIM. THEY ARE OFFERING THAT STATEMENT AGAINST 
7 HIM. THEY ARE -- HE IS NOT THE DECLARANT. HE IS THE ONE 
8 WHO'S OFFERING TO PUT THIS IN. THE STATEMENT THAT THEY WANT 
9 IN IS THE STATEMENT OF THIS GUY, THE DECLARANT. HE'S THE 
10 DECLARANT, THE OFFICER. 
11 THE COURT: OKAY. IF YOU WANT TO READ IT THAT WAY, 
12 LET ME READ THE REST OF THE RULE. THE DECLARANT, IF THAT'S 
13 YOUR CLIENT -- NOW, I DON'T KNOW IF IT APPLIES THIS WAY, BUT 
14 THIS IS WHAT THE RULE SAYS. THE DECLARANT TESTIFIES AT TRIAL 
15 OR HEARING, AND SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION CONCERNING THE 
16 STATEMENT, AND THE STATEMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
17 DECLARANT'S TESTIMONY, OR THE WITNESS DENIES HAVING MADE THE 
18 STATEMENT OR FORGOTTEN, I THINK YOU ARE PROBABLY RIGHT ON THAT 
19 BECAUSE THE OFFICER WROTE THAT DOWN. I DON'T THINK I WOULD 
20 INTRODUCE IT UNDER THAT. 
21 MR. GOLD: THANK YOU. 
22 MR. GILLESPIE: BUT IT WOULD COME UNDER ONE OF 
23 THEM. 
24 THE COURT: BUT IT COMES UNDER THE OTHER, I STILL 
25 THINK. I THINK THIS IS A STATEMENT. 
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1 DETERMINATION THAT YOU CAN PUT IN A DOCUMENT THAT WAS PREPARED 
2 BY SOMEONE ELSE WHO IS AN ADVERSARIAL WITNESS TO THE 
3 DECLARANT, THE DEFENDANT IN THIS MATTER. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY 
4 NO PROVISION IN THAT RULE THAT I SEE THAT ALLOWS A DOCUMENT 
5 PREPARED BY SOMEONE ELSE TO BE PLACED INTO EVIDENCE WHEN THE 
6 STATEMENT ITSELF IS ALREADY IN EVIDENCE. IT HAS BEEN 
7 TESTIFIED TO ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY THE OFFICER. 
8 THE COURT: WELL, THEN, IT'S ALREADY IN. 
9 MR. GOLD: IT'S ALREADY IN. THE REPORT ITSELF IS 
10 NOTHING MORE THAN THE RECORDED TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS. NOW, 
11 WHAT YOU ARE DOING IS ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY IN --
12 THE COURT: CAN I SEE THE EXHIBIT? GO AHEAD, 
13 MR. GOLD. 
14 MR. GOLD: AND THE OFFICER'S WRITTEN STATEMENT OF 
15 THAT TESTIMONY. SO THE DOCUMENT CAN'T COME IN. HE'S ALREADY 
16 TESTIFIED TO EXACTLY THE SAME THING. 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. ARE YOU THROUGH? 
18 YOU ARE MOVING TO INTRODUCE NO. 9? 
19 MR. GILLESPIE: I AM. 
20 THE COURT: OKAY. IT'S COMING IN. AS I INDICATED, 
21 IT'S COMING IN AS A PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT WITH WHAT THIS 
22 OFFICER HAS TESTIFIED TO. IT'S A PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT 
23 OF THE POLICE OFFICER WHICH WAS MADE PRIOR TO HIS TIME IN 
24 COURT AND IS OFFERED TO REFUTE AN IMPLICATION OF FABRICATION 
25 WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY A BIG PART OF THIS CASE. THE RULE 
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1 NOW, THE BACK PART OF THAT STATEMENT, WE CAN TAKE 
2 THAT OUT AND TELL THE JURY THAT --
3 MR. GILLESPIE: YOUR HONOR, I THINK WHETHER OR NOT 
4 THE MOTOR IS RUNNING, ALL THREE OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES HAVE 
5 CALLED THAT TOTALLY INTO QUESTION. I THINK THE FACT THAT THEY 
6 MAY BE DIFFERENT RULES, THEY MAY BE DIFFERENT RULES. BUT THE 
7 SECOND ONE WHERE HIS TESTIMONY'S BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION, 
8 THE FACT THAT WITHIN AN HOUR AND-A-HALF OR TWO HOURS HE PUT, 
9 THE MOTOR WAS RUNNING. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL BE GLAD TO TAKE OUT 
11 EVERYTHING AFTER THE MOTOR WAS RUNNING ON THE BACK, MR. GOLD, 
12 IF YOU WANT ME TO. 
13 MR. GOLD: YOUR HONOR, THE DAMAGE IS DONE. WE 
14 OBJECT TO THE REPORT IN TOTALITY. IN MY ESTIMATION, THE 
15 REPORT IS CLEARLY NOT ADMISSIBLE. ANYTHING THAT WAS IN THAT 
16 REPORT, THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THAT REPORT WHATEVER IS TO REFRESH 
17 THE OFFICER'S MEMORY SO THAT HE CAN TESTIFY. HE HAS CLEARLY 
18 TESTIFIED IN CONNECTION WITH THAT AND, THUS, THE REPORT IS BY 
19 ITSELF CLEARLY INADMISSIBLE UNLESS YOU STRUCK IN ITS ENTIRETY, 
20 UNLESS THE REPORT COULD NOT REFRESH THE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY, 
21 HE COULD NOT TESTIFY ABSENT THE REPORT, IN WHICH CASE, THEY 
22 WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT THE REPORT. WE CLEARLY THINK IT'S A 
23 VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON SEVERAL COUNTS, HIGHLY 
24 PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT IN THAT REGARD BECAUSE IT SEEMS 
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1 THE INTERVIEW OR THE STATEMENT BEHIND JUST PUTS IT IN CONTEXT. 
2 I MEAN, IT SHOWS THE WHOLE THING THE OFFICER WAS SAYING. IF 
3 WE BLOCK SOME OF IT OUT, THE JURY'S GOING TO SAY, YOU KNOW, 
4 WHAT ARE WE MISSING? 
5 THE COURT: I'LL INSTRUCT THEM THAT WE HAVE TAKEN 
6 SOME OF IT OUT. BUT --
7 MR. GILLESPIE: BUT YOU HAVE THERE JUST A SYNOPSIS, 
8 JUST A -- THE OFFICER'S VIEW OF WHAT WAS IMPORTANT RIGHT 
9 AFTER. AND I THINK TO TAKE IT OUT OF CONTEXT IS GOING TO 
10 MITIGATE ITS USEFULNESS. NO QUESTION THE OFFICER HAS BEEN 
11 TOTALLY CHALLENGED ON ALL THESE THINGS. AND THIS IS THE BEST 
12 -- THIS IS WITHIN TWO HOURS. 
13 THE COURT: WELL, HE WASN'T CHALLENGED ON THE FACT 
14 THAT HE STOPPED THE VEHICLE FOR THE EXPIRED NUMBER OR IT 
15 EXPIRED IN 1995 OR THAT THE DEFENDANT SAID IT WAS EXPIRED 
16 AND ALL THOSE THINGS. 
17 MR. GILLESPIE: NO. BUT THEY ARE IN CONTEXT. AND 
18 THEY DON'T DO ANY DAMAGE. 
19 THE COURT: WELL, IF MR. GOLD WOULD LIKE THOSE 
20 TAKEN OUT, I'LL TAKE THOSE OUT. 
21 MR. GOLD: YOUR HONOR, IS THERE --
22 THE COURT: I DON'T WANT TO REVIEW MY RULING, 
23 MR. GOLD. PLEASE DON'T MAKE ME REVIEW --
24 MR. GOLD: IS THERE ANYTHING IN HERE THAT THE 
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1 THAT'S YOUR ARGUMENT, THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE SOMETHING 
2 THAT WAS WRITTEN RIGHT AFTER THE EVENT AS SOME KIND OF 
3 INDICATION THE POLICE OFFICER DID NOT MAKE THIS AS A 
4 FABRICATION AND IT WAS NOT ACTING WITH THE PROPER MOTIVES. 
5 NOW, I COULD BE WRONG. I HAVE BEEN DOING THIS FOR A LONG 
6 TIME. BUT IF YOU GET THIS THING OVERTURNED, IT PROBABLY WON'T 
7 BE THE FIRST ONE THAT'S OVERTURNED. BUT THIS IS WHAT I 
8 BELIEVE, MR. GOLD, AND IT'S COMING IN. AND I WILL TAKE OUT 
9 THE OTHER PART OF THAT WITH YOUR CONSENT AT YOUR REQUEST. I 
10 WON'T DO IT IF YOU DON'T DO IT AND CONSENT TO IT BECAUSE I AM 
11 GOING TO HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO THE JURY THAT I TOOK SOMETHING OUT 
12 OF IT, WHITED OUT IT, AND IT DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH 
13 ANYTHING THEY SHOULD CONSIDER IN THIS CASE. DO YOU WANT ME TO 
14 TAKE IT OUT, AGAIN, MR. GOLD? 
15 MR. GOLD: WHAT IS IT SPECIFICALLY THAT YOU ARE 
16 REFERRING TO THAT YOU ARE GOING TO TAKE OUT? 
17 THE COURT: YOU GOT IT BEFORE YOU? 
18 MR. GOLD: I DO. 
19 THE COURT: WHERE IT SAYS I WAS JUST PULLING OUT. 
20 I STOPPED AND APPROACHED THE DRIVER, PLATE HAD EXPIRED IN 
21 1995, EVERYTHING AFTER THAT. AND ANYTHING BEFORE THAT 
22 DOESN'T GO TO AN ISSUE THAT YOU HAVE CONTESTED. 
23 MR. GOLD: I AM UNABLE TO FIND WHAT YOU ARE LOOKING 
24 AT. I HOPE WE ARE LOOKING AT THE SAME THING. 
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1 THE COURT: OKAY. AND THEN ON THE SECOND PAGE, 
2 EVERYTHING AFTER WHAT I HAVE JUST TALKED ABOUT, INCLUDING THE 
3 SIGNATURE OF THE OFFICER, ET CETERA: WE CAN EXPLAIN TO THEM 
4 THESE WERE TAKEN FROM THE REPORT. AND I WILL EXPLAIN TO THEM, 
5 IF YOU WANT TO, THAT PART OF IT'S BEEN TAKEN OFF OF IT BECAUSE 
6 IT DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WHAT THEY NEEDED TO 
7 CONSIDER. 
8 MR. GOLD: VERY WELL. 
9 THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU NEED THIS TO CONTINUE 
10 YOUR EXAMINATION RIGHT NOW? 
11 MR. GILLESPIE: YES. CAN WE MARK UP YOUR ORIGINAL? 
12 THE COURT: LET'S TAKE A SHORT RECESS AND I WILL 
13 FIX THIS. COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
14 (WHEREUPON, A BRIEF RECESS WAS TAKEN.) 
15 THE COURT: MARK THIS AS EXHIBIT 9. WHY DON'T YOU 
16 GENTLEMEN COME UP AND WE'LL TAKE A LOOK AT THAT. 
17 THE COURT: MR. GILLESPIE, LET ME GIVE YOU BACK 
18 WHAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY MARKED AS EXHIBIT NO. 9. OR WOULD 
19 YOU LIKE THAT RETAINED FOR PART OF THE RECORD IN ANY WAY? 
20 MR. GILLESPIE: I'LL ACCEPT THE SUBSTITUTION. 
21 THE COURT: MR. GOLD, WOULD YOU LIKE THE ORIGINAL 
22 EXHIBIT MARKED RETAIN FOR THE RECORD? 
23 MR. GOLD: THE ORIGINAL EXHIBIT? 
24 THE COURT: AS MARKED, THE ONE BEFORE WE --
25 MR. GILLESPIE: MAYBE WE OUGHT TO, FOR CLARITY, 
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